Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Cynthia Macdonald and Crates (Theb)

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12 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
7938 Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
7967 Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7965 Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
7934 Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
7958 Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
7959 How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
7960 Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
7951 Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
7964 How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
7971 Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7955 Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]