Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, K Marx / F Engels and Kit Fine

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23 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
15072 Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K]
9211 A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
5287 Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17287 Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
15071 Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768 Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776 A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9767 A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
9770 Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
9772 Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
9773 With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
9774 Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]