Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle
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17 ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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21538
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If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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5370
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Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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7545
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Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
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14429
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Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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21709
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You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
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6111
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As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
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6434
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Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
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18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
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5418
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In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
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13988
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Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
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22315
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There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
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22316
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A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
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9051
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Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
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9054
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Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
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18775
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Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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