Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Xunzi (Xun Kuang) and Katherine Hawley
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10 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
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16211
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A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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16219
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Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
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16223
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Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
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16226
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Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
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16208
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Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley]
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16221
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Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley]
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