Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Theodore Sider and Godfrey Vesey
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15 ideas
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
14760
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Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
15008
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Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
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15013
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Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
15014
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Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
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We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
13693
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A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
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13692
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A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
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13694
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We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]
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13695
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Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
14983
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Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
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