Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Stephen S. Colvin and Richard Cumberland
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9 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726
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We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
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20727
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Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729
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Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
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20730
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If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
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20731
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The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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