Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Ross P. Cameron and Joseph Melia
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9 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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18875
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Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
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18878
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Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
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18881
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For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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5736
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No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
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5735
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Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
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