Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Hilary Putnam and Walter Charleton
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13 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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6280
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Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
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17644
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Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
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2349
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Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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9943
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You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
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22181
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Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha]
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14214
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If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis]
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17648
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It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
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14205
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The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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7610
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A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
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