Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Henry Laycock and Michel de Montaigne
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8 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
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12792
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The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
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12799
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Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
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12818
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We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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6262
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We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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