Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Georg W.F.Hegel and Antonio Damasio
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18 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
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5645
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The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
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21762
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To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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21977
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Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
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21760
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Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
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22772
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Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
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5646
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Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
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21765
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The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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22059
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Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
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22083
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Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
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22078
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Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
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15634
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Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
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21755
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For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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21754
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Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
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22079
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Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate]
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