Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Democritus and John Heil
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20 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
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20901
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True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
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20902
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Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
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20904
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The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
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20903
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The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
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20893
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Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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7017
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The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil]
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18539
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Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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4616
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A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]
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7003
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There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
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16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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7045
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Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
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7065
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Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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16060
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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16064
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
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18505
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Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
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18499
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Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
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18512
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Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
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20896
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It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
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7020
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Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
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