Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Daniel Garber and J Ladyman / D Ross
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
12 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
|
14948
|
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14942
|
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
|
14947
|
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
|
16062
|
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
|
16061
|
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
|
14941
|
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
|
12695
|
Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
|
10493
|
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14934
|
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
|
16060
|
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
|
|
16064
|
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
|
|
14909
|
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
|