Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Bertrand Russell and Godfrey Vesey
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17 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16045
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General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
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16061
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21684
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Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
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21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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19051
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Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
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6100
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Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
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10968
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Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
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6113
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To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
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6114
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'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
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21722
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Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
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21681
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Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
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6419
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In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
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6438
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Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472
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Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
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