Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Alonzo Church and Colin McGinn
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10 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
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A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
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To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
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