Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Gottlob Frege and John Bacon

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

16 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
11008 Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
8643 Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
19470 Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
5657 Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8911 If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
8634 The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17443 Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
17445 Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10539 Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9578 If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
19471 A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
17431 Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13879 For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10642 Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]