Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Tim Mawson and Bertrand Russell
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38 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
14463
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Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
11010
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Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14161
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Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14173
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What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
6402
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In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16045
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General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21684
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Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
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21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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19051
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Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
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6100
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Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
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10968
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Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
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6113
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To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
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6114
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'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
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21722
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Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
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21681
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Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
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6419
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In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
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6438
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Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
6472
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Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
21538
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If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
5370
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Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
7545
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Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
14429
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Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
21709
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You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
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6111
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As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
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6434
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Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
5418
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In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22315
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There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell]
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22316
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A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9051
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Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
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9054
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Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
18775
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Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
14163
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Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell]
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7533
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The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
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