Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Michael Dummett and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

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13 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter]
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett]
For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]