Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, Rahulabhadra and E.J. Lowe

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24 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
8321 All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
4239 Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
8300 Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
4202 Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
15541 Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
8281 Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
4201 Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8270 Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
4221 Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
8308 Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4220 Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
4225 Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
8314 Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
8316 Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
8318 The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
8323 It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
8313 Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8258 Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
8301 Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
8283 Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8284 The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
13122 Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
4196 The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]