Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, John Searle and Amie L. Thomasson
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10 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
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Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
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Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
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Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
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Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
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Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
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Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
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Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
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