Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Richard Polt and Bertrand Russell

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96 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110 Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
6107 It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
14452 All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
16486 The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
21495 Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
14462 In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
5395 Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
14106 Implication cannot be defined [Russell]
14108 It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
14464 Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
14167 The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
10057 Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
22329 Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
12444 Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053 Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
21539 Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell]
18944 Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
2947 Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7758 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
6092 In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
6101 Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
6115 Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
7528 Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
23476 Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell]
23477 We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell]
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
21597 Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
14105 There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18722 Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
16489 Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16479 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
16481 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
16487 Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
16480 A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
16483 Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
14104 Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
14114 Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
5772 The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
21566 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
6102 You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
10423 There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
14458 Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
4945 Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
18942 Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
7745 Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5386 Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
7744 Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
10450 Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
14457 Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
18941 Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
15159 The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
10449 Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
6410 The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
2612 Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
7757 "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18943 Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
6439 Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
10426 A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
7311 The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
14455 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
6411 Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
10433 Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5385 The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
1608 The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
7754 Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
21529 Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
6333 The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
6412 Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
7743 Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
7310 Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
12006 Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
4569 Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
11009 Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
21549 The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
12796 Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
7532 Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
11988 Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
14137 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
6061 Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18273 Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17629 Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
17630 The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
17640 Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
6109 Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
7557 To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell]
14149 The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell]
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
21565 Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
15895 Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365 Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
10711 Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
6407 The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21564 Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell]
21567 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
16475 A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]