Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Erving Goffman and Kit Fine
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21 ideas
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
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23548
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Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
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17286
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Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
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9775
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Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
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12220
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Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
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11175
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Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
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15592
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The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
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15593
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Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
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15590
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It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
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15591
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In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
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15595
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The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
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15594
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'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
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9148
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I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
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14620
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Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
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15599
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Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
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11176
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The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
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12222
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Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
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10569
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If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
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10570
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Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
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23539
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Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
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11174
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A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
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9771
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Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
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