Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Bob Hale and Sarah Sawyer

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
19296 If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
19289 Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10316 We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
10312 Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
10313 Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
10322 If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
19298 Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]