Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, Bernard Linsky and Willard Quine

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

57 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13010 In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
9020 My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9028 Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9002 Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
8789 Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
10014 Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes]
10828 Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13681 Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
12219 Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19043 Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10012 Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
13829 If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
1618 We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
21698 All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
8455 Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
8456 Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
9016 Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
1611 Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10926 Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine]
10922 Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine]
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
9015 Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10705 Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9027 A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9003 Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]