Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Michael Williams and James O. Young
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10 ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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19079
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For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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3593
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The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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3584
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Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M]
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19076
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Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
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19077
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Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
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19078
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Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
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19084
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Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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19083
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How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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19075
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Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
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