Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, James Gordon Finlayson and David Lewis
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9 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
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Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
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Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
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Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
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Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
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If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
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Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
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Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis]
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