Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Anand Vaidya and Donald Davidson
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32 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
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6396
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A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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23295
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Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
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19160
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A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
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23284
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Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
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23286
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Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
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19151
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Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
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23291
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Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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8188
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Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
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19144
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'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
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19044
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Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
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18702
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Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
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23292
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Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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18902
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Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
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23298
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Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
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19148
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There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
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19166
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The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
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19167
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Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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19081
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Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
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19150
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Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19145
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We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
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19146
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Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
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19174
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Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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23288
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When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
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23297
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The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19136
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Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
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19139
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Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
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19147
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Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
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19172
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To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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23296
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We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
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19153
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Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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23287
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Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
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19170
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Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
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