Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eubulides, Pascal Engel and Saul A. Kripke
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13 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
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4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
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4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
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3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
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4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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15327
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Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
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15343
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Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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14966
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The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
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14967
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Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
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16328
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Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
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4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
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4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
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