Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Brand Blanshard and Paul Horwich
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
|
6334
|
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
|
6342
|
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
|
6332
|
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
|
19080
|
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
|
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
|
6335
|
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
|
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
|
6344
|
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
|
|
6336
|
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
|
|
23299
|
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
|
|
6337
|
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
|