Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Boethius and David Lewis
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19 ideas
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
15562
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Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555
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Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405
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A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
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8427
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I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
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8433
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There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10392
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It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
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8419
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The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
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15551
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Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
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15552
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We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421
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Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525
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The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
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17524
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Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
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8397
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Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
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8423
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My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
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8426
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One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
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15553
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Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
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8608
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Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
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8584
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Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
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9659
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Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
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