Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Morris Kline and Bernard Williams

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25 ideas

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
4252 Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
4116 A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
4112 A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
3236 Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
4113 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
4250 The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
4110 Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
4249 "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
4248 Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
4121 Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
22409 We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
4122 If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22407 Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
4124 Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
4245 Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
4246 Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]