Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Philippa Foot and Peter Schulte
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25 ideas
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
23695
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Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
22470
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A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
22499
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We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
22402
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Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
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23145
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Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
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22401
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Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
22398
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Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
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22478
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The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
23692
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Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
22468
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Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22495
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Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
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22373
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People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
22456
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Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
22469
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Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
22403
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Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
22472
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The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
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22479
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Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
22400
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Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
22391
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Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
22395
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Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
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22389
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Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
22448
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We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22463
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Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
22459
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For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
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23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22502
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Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
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