Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Herodotus, Baruch de Spinoza and Alasdair MacIntyre
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30 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
8059
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The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
8034
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We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
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8036
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Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
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8049
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Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4867
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Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21873
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Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
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21872
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We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
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8045
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The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
8051
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Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
17189
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The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
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17207
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By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
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8019
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Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
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17229
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If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
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8048
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When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
8035
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In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
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8037
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The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
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8040
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Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
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8042
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Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
8002
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Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
8012
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The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
4845
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We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4848
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Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
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17217
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Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
7833
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Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
17224
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If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
21870
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Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
8005
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'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
4860
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Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
4847
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Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
4859
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Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]
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