Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, David Hilbert and John Kekes

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

30 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
19738 Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
20145 Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20170 Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
23089 Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
23094 Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
23095 Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
23093 Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
23096 Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
23087 Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
23098 Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20165 Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
20171 Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
20175 If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23090 Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
20174 Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20159 Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
20161 The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
20156 We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
20150 There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
20158 Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20151 Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
20152 Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
20153 Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23117 Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
23119 Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
20162 Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
23088 Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23097 What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20157 Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
20154 Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]