Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Donald Davidson and John Cottingham
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15 ideas
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020
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If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072
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We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
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20076
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An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20074
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We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024
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Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
6385
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The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045
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Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
6384
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The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
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4316
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Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20075
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Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
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3395
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Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
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23734
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The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
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23737
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Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
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6664
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Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
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19698
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Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
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