Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, Rowland Stout and Philippa Foot

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26 ideas

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
20046 For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20049 Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
22480 Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
22372 Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
22393 I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
20060 Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
20055 A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
20056 In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
20053 An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
20048 There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22481 There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
22482 I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22384 A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
22385 The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
22386 Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
22387 Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
22388 Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20068 Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
4692 It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
4694 Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]