Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, Rowland Stout and Philippa Foot

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49 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20035 Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
20084 Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20061 Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
20079 Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
20080 If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
20059 I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20081 Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20044 The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
20039 The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
20047 Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
20065 Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
20067 You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
20078 The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20036 Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
20066 Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20073 Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
20069 A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
20070 An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
20071 An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20038 If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20050 Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
20052 If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
20077 If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
20049 Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
20046 For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23437 Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
22480 Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
22372 Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
22393 I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
20060 Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
20055 A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
20056 In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
20053 An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
20048 There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22481 There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
22482 I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
22384 A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
22465 We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
22385 The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
22386 Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
22387 Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
22388 Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
22466 We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
22467 Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20068 Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
4692 It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
4694 Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]