Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Paul Audi and Michael Dummett

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17 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
8168 To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
8181 A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
8182 Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
8183 If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054 Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]
8176 We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8170 Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064 Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10516 A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
9836 Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
8189 Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett]
8191 The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
8169 We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]