Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Michael Tye and Willard Quine

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49 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
21701 Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
1619 There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
9009 Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
9471 Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine]
8202 Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
1609 I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
1617 The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15788 Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19159 Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
16932 Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18967 A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
18968 The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
9007 It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
9008 There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
9010 We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
9021 A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
19045 Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]