Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Carrie Jenkins and Jerry A. Fodor

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15 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]