Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Donald Davidson and Hilary Putnam

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22 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2346 Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
2354 "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2336 Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
2334 Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
2335 Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]