display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
43 ideas
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
| 9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
| 22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
| 7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
| 7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
| 8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
| 9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
| 15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
| 18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
| 7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
| 4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
| 4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
| 8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
| 15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
| 4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
| 22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
| 7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
| 7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |