Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, David E. Cooper and Timothy Williamson
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17 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
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4564
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I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
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4565
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The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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9595
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You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
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4562
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Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
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4563
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'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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4571
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Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
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4566
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Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
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21615
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References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
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18038
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The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
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19534
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How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
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19535
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Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
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19533
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Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
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4572
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If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
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19532
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Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
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21624
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It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
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19216
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Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
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4576
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An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
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