Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Timothy Williamson and Gabriel M.A. Segal
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
9 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595
|
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
|
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
21615
|
References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18038
|
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
|
19534
|
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
|
19535
|
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
|
19533
|
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
19532
|
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
21624
|
It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson]
|
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19216
|
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
|