Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Jerry A. Fodor and Archimedes

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24 ideas

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658 Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492 Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
11143 If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
12662 We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
12635 Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
12652 Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
2471 Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
2472 For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654 You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
12659 Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
12660 One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
12631 Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]