Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, David Bostock and Gottlob Frege

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41 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
19469 We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
8620 Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege]
9581 Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
8162 Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
9818 A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
18265 We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
16379 Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16876 We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
16875 We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
9870 Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
13878 Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
7736 A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
17430 Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
8622 Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
8651 A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege]
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9846 Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9976 Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
10803 Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege]
9988 If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege]
9579 Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
9587 How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
9890 The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
9855 Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett]
10802 Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege]
10525 Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K]
10526 Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K]
10556 We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege]
9882 You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege]
9881 From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
5816 Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
11846 If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]