Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Max J. Cresswell and John Heil
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9 ideas
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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4597
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Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
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4609
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It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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4596
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The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
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7012
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If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
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4598
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Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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4619
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'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
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4620
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Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
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7043
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Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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4594
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A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
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