Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Saul A. Kripke

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6 ideas

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]