Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eubulides, Saul A. Kripke and Frank Jackson
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12 ideas
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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7430
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Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
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6976
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In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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6986
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Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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6992
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If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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7880
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If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
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7378
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No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
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7377
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Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
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7867
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If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
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3228
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Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
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5832
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Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
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4968
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Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
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9178
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Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
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