Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eubulides, Sarah Sawyer and David Papineau
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17 ideas
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
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7860
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The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
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7862
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Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
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3513
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How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
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3514
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Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
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7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
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7858
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If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
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3510
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Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
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3511
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Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
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7865
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Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
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3515
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Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
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7892
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The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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7879
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Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
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20971
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Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
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7856
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It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
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7881
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Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
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3512
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If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
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7866
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Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
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