Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, John Heil and Kurt Vonnegut

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23 ideas

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
7061 Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
7063 Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
7064 Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
7062 Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
7059 The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
7012 If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
7043 Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]